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INTRODUCTION

OME instructive partnership law cases were decided during this
Survey period, including one by the Texas Supreme Court that reversed a lower court decision reported in last year's Survey. The
courts have given practitioners insights on how to handle actions involving partners (including in bankruptcy), guidance on oral partnerships, instruction on the nature of fiduciary duties, and advice on drafting
partnership agreements. As is our recent custom, our coverage includes
cases involving limited liability companies and some governed by Delaware law.
II. HOW TO SUE A GENERAL PARTNER-REVISITED
KAO Holdings, L.P. v. Young'
In last year's Survey, we presented the direct predecessor of this case,
dealing with service of process on a general partner in a suit to impose
liability for a limited partnership obligation. The Texas Supreme Court
has spoken, and taken us to a different place.
* B.A., Southern Methodist University (with high honors); J.D., University of Texas
(with honors). Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.S., University of Georgia; J.D., B.C.L., Louisiana State University Paul M.
Hebert Law Center. Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. 261 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. 2008).
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This case answered the question whether a judgment against a general
partner was valid where the general partner was not named in the suit,
but did receive service effected on the partnership.2 The answer turned
on the interpretation of two statutes: the Texas Revised Partnership Act
(TRPA) section 3.05(c), which states that "[a] judgment against a partnership is not by itself a judgment against a partner, but a judgment may be
entered against a partner who has been served with process in a suit
against the partnership,"' 3 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
(TCPRC) section 17.022, which states that "[c]itation served on one
member of a partnership authorizes a judgment against the partnership
and the partner actually served."'4 As reported in last year's Survey, the
court of appeals interpreted section 17.022 to mean that, in a suit against
a partnership, serving the partnership by delivering the petition to one of
its general partners authorizes judgment against both the partnership and
that partner. 5 The supreme court rejected that analysis, noting that the
original predecessor of section 17.022 was enacted at a time (1858) when
partnerships were not recognized as separate entities that could be sued,6
and the intent of the statute was to allow a judgment against a partner to
be satisfied from partnership property. 7 The supreme court then reviewed the language and intent of section 3.05(c), noting that it must be
construed standing alone in the absence of express legislative intent indicating that TCPRC section 17.022 be incorporated into TRPA section
3.05.8 The court concluded that "a judgment against the partnership is
not automatically a judgment against the partner .... [J]udgment cannot
be rendered against a partner who has not been served merely because
judgment has been rendered against the partnership."9 The court bolstered its conclusion by citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure section 239,
which provides for judgment only against a "defendant," 10 and section
2. Id. at 61.
3. Id. at 62 (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.05(c) (Vernon Supp.
2007) (emphasis added)).
4. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.022 (Vernon Supp. 2007)
(emphasis added)).
5. Id. For more on the court of appeals decision, see Steven A. Waters & Peter
Christofferson, Partnerships,61 SMU L. REV. 995, 995-98 (2008).
6. At that time, only individuals and corporations could be sued. KAO, 261 S.W.3d
at 62. A partnership was not considered to be a distinct legal "person," merely a collection
of individuals joined together for a common enterprise. See id. A partnership was not
formally recognized as a "person" under Texas law until the Texas Uniform Partnership
Act was enacted in 1962. See id. at 62 n.9.
7. Id. at 62-63.
8. Id. at 63-64.
9. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). The court also went to some length to distinguish
Fincher v. B&D Air Conditioning & Heating Co., on which the lower court relied heavily
and that we discussed in last year's Survey. See Waters & Christofferson, supra note 5.
The primary factual difference emphasized by the supreme court was a post-trial amendment filed by the plaintiff in Fincher that named Fincher individually as a defendant.
KAO, 261 S.W.3d at 64. Fincher was originally covered in this journal in 1993, and that
article was cited by the lower court in this case. See Steven A. Waters & Felicity A. Fowler,
Partnerships,46 SMU L. REV. 1631, 1645 (1993).
10. KAO, 261 S.W.3d at 65 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 239).
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301, which requires a court's judgment to conform to the pleadings. 1
Piecing those things together, the court concluded (like the dissent in the
court of appeals decision) that it would be improper to enter a judgment
against a general partner in a suit against the partnership if the pleadings
did not name the general partner as a party defendant. 12 The general
partner's actual knowledge of both the suit against the partnership and of
his own liability for the partnership's obligations was not enough for the
court.13 It would have been easy, and instructive, for the court to state
that the required "service" of process on a general partner is more than
the physical act of delivering paper, and that "service" requires identification in the pleadings of the general partner as a party defendant.
But the supreme court has given unambiguous guidance to practitioners: if you want a judgment against a general partner, individually, then
name that partner in the suit as a defendant. We're reminded of a quote
from noted torts and maritime scholar Frank L. Maraist, who once advised one of the authors: "When in doubt, sue everybody."
III.

WHY NOT TO SUE A LIMITED PARTNER

14
Asshauer v. Wells Fargo Foothill

This case from the Dallas Court of Appeals dealt with standing and
veil-piercing issues involving investors in a multi-tiered, real estate development limited partnership. 15 The investors put their funds into four limited partnerships that in turn invested as limited partners in a master
limited partnership that developed the property. Wells Fargo provided
mezzanine financing'16 to help fund completion of construction and, as
part of that financing transaction, took a limited partner's interest in the
master limited partnership.' 7 Eventually, Wells Fargo received some
form of payment from the partnership, and then the property was foreclosed on (by a party other than Wells Fargo), effectively wiping out the
individual investors.' 8 Those individual investors sued Wells Fargo for
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and alter ego/piercing the corporate veil,
11. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 301). The pleadings in this instance did not name the
general partner, resulting in a proposed judgment that did not include the party from
whom relief was sought.

12. Id. at 64-65.
13. Id. at 61. The court also hinted that the general partner might have a due process
argument because the judgment being reviewed was a default judgment. See id. at 65.
14. 263 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
15. Id. at 470.
16. Id. The court described the mezzanine financing as financing secured by collateral
other than the real property owned by the borrower and subordinate to the original construction financing. Id. at 470 n.2. It is typical for mezzanine financing to be secured by a
pledge of ownership interests in the property owner or a parent further up the tree.
17. Id. at 470. Because of the nature of the case, the court did not fully develop all of
the facts of the underlying transactions. Id. at 471 n.3.
18. Id. at 470. The opinion does not state whether the amount paid to Wells Fargo was
a distribution, a loan repayment, or a combination of the two. Because of the standing
issue, that was not relevant to the court's decision. Id. at 471 n.3.
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among other claims. 19
The appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the
individual investors had no standing to sue Wells Fargo. For one thing,
the individual investors claimed damages that belonged to the limited
partnerships in which they were partners-those limited partnerships
were the proper parties to bring the claims. 20 The individual investors
also argued that because the limited partnership structure was set up to
perpetrate a fraud, they should be able to personally sue Wells Fargo.
The court rejected that argument out of hand, noting that the crux of the
Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act (TRLPA) was to provide liability
protection for limited partners, and that the only exception was a limited
partner behaving as a general partner. 21 Finally, the individual investors
alleged that they could sue personally based on an alter ego or veil-piercing theory.22 In rejecting that argument, the court noted that other courts
had determined that those theories do not apply to limited partnerships
because the general partners are always liable for the debts and obligathe need to pierce the veil to impose
tions of the partnership, eliminating 23
liability on a limited partner owner.
IV.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

24

Chacko v. Mathew

This review of a summary judgment from the Houston Court of Appeals reminds us that the statute of frauds can apply to oral partnership
agreements. A purported oral partnership was formed to purchase and
operate a restaurant, with the purchase price to be paid over several
years. 25 In a dispute about the restaurant's profits, the defendant invoked the statute of frauds to invalidate a purported oral partnership
agreement, on the basis that it would take longer than one year to com19. Id. at 470. The suit was not brought by the limited partnerships that were partners
in the master development partnership to which Wells Fargo made its loan and in which it,
too, was a partner.
20. Id. at 472. The court offered a lengthy discussion of Nauslarv. Coors Brewing Co.,
170 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.), the controlling authority. Id. at 471-72.
The court there noted that, under a similar fact pattern, the plaintiff's losses were "indirect
to and duplicative of" the limited partnership's right of action. Id. at 472. The individual
investors here tried to distinguish Nauslar as involving an actual business and not an investment vehicle. Id. The court was unpersuaded.
21. Id. at 472-73. The court did note that the investors amended their petition to allege that Wells Fargo possessed significant management powers under the partnership
agreement that could elevate it to general partner status. Id. at 473. The court rejected
that claim because there was no showing that Wells Fargo actually exercised those powers.
Id.
22. Id. The investors argued that the principle of the equitable remedy that allows the
corporate form to be disregarded in the case of fraud or sham entities should permit them
to pierce Wells Fargo's limited partner veil and recover against it directly for the alleged
investment fraud. Id.
23. Id. at 474.
24. No. 14-07-00613-CV, 2008 WL 2390486 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 12,
2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
25. Id.at *1.
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plete the restaurant purchase. 26 The court rejected that argument, noting
that in an at-will, oral partnership the statute of frauds applied only if it
was impossible for the agreement to be performed within one year.2 7 Because the purchase of the restaurant could have been finalized within one
year, the statute of frauds was found not to apply.28 In a partnership
context, the statute of frauds will apply only where performance, even
when structured to require more than one year, cannot possibly be completed within one year.
29
Olson v. Halvorsen

Recent readers of this Survey know that the authors have included
some Delaware cases, especially limited liability law cases, for two principal reasons: (i) Delaware is entrenched as the "business law jurisdiction"
of choice for many, in part because of the perception that it has businessfriendly statutes and a business court system, the Chancery Courts, that
hears only business cases; and (ii) relatively, there are few limited liability
law cases anywhere and the proliferation of that entity form amplifies the
30
importance of the cases that do exist.
An unpublished 2008 Delaware Chancery Court decision determined,
for the first time, the applicability of the statute of frauds to the Delaware
LLC Act. 31 The parties involved ran a hedge fund which they managed
through several limited liability companies. A draft company agreement
for the managing entity was never executed by the founders/members,
and they disagreed on whether the parties reached agreement on terms,
particularly an alleged multi-year, earn-out provision that was triggered
by the departure of a founder. When one founder left, he sued to recover
the amount of his earn-out. The company and the remaining founders
disputed the existence of an enforceable company agreement calling for
an earn-out, invoking the statute of frauds to invalidate any purported
32
oral company agreement.
26. Id. at *2. The restaurant also was subject to a five-year lease, which the court
found not to be relevant because it involved only one of the two purported partnership
parties (the one obligated under the lease with the landlord). Id. at *4.
27. Id. at *3-4 (citing Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist] 2005, pet. denied); Heathington v. Heathington Lumber Co., 398
S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ); and Boutell v. Hill, 498 S.W.2d
713, 714 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ)); see also Waters & Christofferson, supra note
5, at 999.
28. Chacko, 2008 WL 2390486, at *4.
29. No. 1884-VCL, 2008 WL 4661831 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2008).
30. Until fairly recently, limited liability companies were not the entity of choice in
Texas because they, unlike partnerships, were subject to the franchise tax. The advent of
the so-called "margins tax" in Texas, which replaced the franchise tax and expanded the
types of entities subject to the tax to include, essentially, any entity that takes advantage of
statutory limitations on its liability, including limited partnerships and registered limited
liability partnerships, will cause many more to use LLCs in Texas in the future. See generally TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 2008).
31. See generally Olson, 2008 WL 4661831.
32. Id. at *2-3.
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The court could find no case, in any jurisdiction, that discussed the applicability of the statue of frauds to LLC agreements. And it noted that,
although the LLC Act specifically contemplated oral operating agreements, it was silent on the application of the statute of frauds. 33 The
court ruled that the statute of frauds, as a statutorily-enacted principle of
contract law, did apply to LLC agreements, but noted that few oral LLC
agreements were likely to contain a term or provision that could not possibly be performed within one year, limiting the opportunities to invoke
the statute of frauds to invalidate such an oral LLC agreement. 34 Unfortunately for the departed founder in Olson, the purported oral LLC
agreement did contain a term that by its nature required more than one
year to perform (the multi-year earn-out), and the court invalidated that
35
oral agreement as unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
V. JURISDICTION
36
Rogers v. TexWest, LLC

Does ownership of a limited partner's interest in a Texas limited partnership, alone, constitute sufficient contact with Texas for the limited
partner to be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of Texas courts? If
the suit arises out of the creation of the limited partnership, the Dallas
Court of Appeals says the answer can be "yes."
This case involved a limited partnership formed to help implement the
stipulated judgment of a California divorce court which dissolved the
marriage of William and Karen Rogers. As part of the divorce decree,
the Rogers created Red Boot Investments, L.P., a Texas limited partnership (Red Boot), to manage and, over time, liquidate their marital assets.
The partnership agreement provided that it was to be interpreted under
California law, but established the partnership's principal place of business in Dallas, William's hometown. William managed the assets through
Red Boot's general partner, Tex West, LLC; Karen owned a limited partner's interest and received monthly distributions from Red Boot. Disputes eventually arose over management of the assets, distributions, and
other partnership agreement matters, leading William to bring a declaratory judgment action in Texas seeking construction of the partnership
agreement's distribution requirements. Karen made a special appearance, claiming that she lacked sufficient contact with Texas for the court
33. Id. at *3 (citing 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2008): "Limited liability
company agreement means any agreement (whether referred to as limited liability company agreement, operating agreement, or otherwise), written, oral, or implied, of the member or members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its
business").
34. Id. The "not likely to have a term that cannot be performed within one year" is
debatable; what is not, is that oral agreements are inherently difficult to prove.
35. Id. at *5. The departing founder did receive a consolation payment of more than
$100 million from his capital account and salary for 2005. Id. at *2.
36. 261 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
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to have specific jurisdiction over her.
The meat of the court's jurisdiction determination was tied to a minimum contacts analysis, specifically whether Karen had "purposefully
availed" herself of the privilege of conducting activities within Texas. 38
The court found that Karen had extensively negotiated the partnership
agreement, that she agreed that the partnership's principal place of business was Dallas, that she agreed that it would be qualified to transact
business in Texas, and that she received regular distributions from partnership funds disbursed from Texas bank accounts. 39 The court concluded that Karen should have reasonably anticipated, from those
contacts, that she could be sued in Texas in a dispute involving the partnership agreement. 40 The court distinguished two cases cited by Kareneach holding that partnership activities cannot be used to create jurisdiction over limited partners because they lack partnership management authority-stating that those cases involved liability for the actions of the
partnership and that, in contrast, this suit "arises out of the creation of the
partnership."41
While the court's separation of jurisdiction between suits that arise out
of the actions of the partnership 42 and suits that relate to the creation of a
partnership may be helpful, the factors that the court used to establish
jurisdiction here are of concern. Particularly, the court focused on the
fact that the partnership's principal place of business was Dallas, that it
was qualified to transact business in Texas, 43 that the partnership funds
distributed to the limited partner were earned in Texas, and that partnership assets were deposited into a Texas bank account. 4 4 Even taken together, this support seems flimsy. A limited partnership interest is, by
nature, a passive investment, and limited partners risk losing their liability protection if they undertake management activities of a general partner.4 5 This finding undercuts the concept of a limited partnership as a

37. Id. at 821. A court holds "specific jurisdiction" over a party when the party's actual conduct ("specific" actions) within the forum results in the alleged liability, even
though that party does not have systematic and continuous contacts with the forum (which

might serve as a basis for "general jurisdiction").
38. Id. (citing Michana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex.

2005)).
39. Id. at 821-22.
40. Id. at 822. In addition, the court noted the following two dispositive factors: (i) she
signed the partnership agreement for an entity that operates entirely in Texas, and (ii) the
distributions that she received resulted largely from business conducted in Texas. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. In particular, the court cites Hotel Partnersv. Craig, 933 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) and NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 812 S.W.2d 441,
444 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ). See Rogers, 261 S.W.3d at 822 n.1. Those
cases demonstrate that it is over-reaching to find specific jurisdiction over a non-resident
limited partner in a dispute with a third party over partnership liability when the limited
partner has no management authority.
43. This flows automatically from its being organized as a Texas limited partnershipit is curious that the court thought it worthy of mention.
44. Id. at 822.
45. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 3.03 (Vernon Supp. 2008); TEX. Bus.
ORGs. CODE ANN. § 153.102 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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passive investment vehicle because the conduct of business and the existence of bank accounts in the forum are management activities, which are
outside the limited partner's control. Furthermore, a finding of specific
jurisdiction would be possible over every limited partner that invests in a
limited partnership based or authorized to do business in a foreign forum. 46 Where partners agree on a proper forum and venue for partnership disputes in the partnership document itself, or where the limited
partner is generally subject to the jurisdiction of the forum apart from the
partnership's activities, jurisdiction clearly is proper. Under the facts of
this case, however, it is hard to understand how the court found a basis
for jurisdiction.
VI.
In re

FIDUCIARY DUTY

47

Kilroy

Last year's Survey featured two cases styled "In re Kilroy"; this year
we have one, a procedural successor to one of last year's cases. The pertinent issue concerned whether a fiduciary duty existed under Delaware
law. A claim is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy
Code if the foundation for the claim is the debtor's "'fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity." 48 So, before a court can evaluate
an objection to the discharge of a claim based on this bankruptcy code
provision, it must determine whether a fiduciary duty exists-was the
person against whom a claim is asserted acting in a fiduciary capacity? In
last year's case, we noted that the court, looking to Delaware law, found
that
because Kilroy was the majority owner of the LLC that was the general partner of the limited partnership at issue, Kilroy owed fiduciary
duties to [the debtor], a minority owner of the limited partner. The
court invoked analogous Delaware corporate law that a majority
shareholder is a controlling shareholder, and that control is the key
to finding a fiduciary relationship .... 49
This year's case presents the same issue as part of a memorandum
opinion in a summary judgment context; however, here the court had the
entire partnership agreement in the record. 50 The court, citing the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (DRULPA), decided
that it did not have to look beyond the partnership agreement itself to
46. There was no showing that the limited partner undertook even one of the laundry
list of activities expressly afforded to general partners under the Texas Business Organizations Code. See generally TEX. Bus. ORGs. CODE ANN. § 153.152 (Vernon Supp. 2008);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 3.01 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
47. No. 05-90083-H4-7, 2008 WL 780692 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2008).
48. Waters & Christofferson, supra note 5, at 1000 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)
(2006)).
49. Id.
50. Kilroy, 2008 WL 780692, at *6. The issue survived a motion to dismiss in the previous case, but the ruling was based entirely on Delaware law. See generally Kilroy, 354 B.R.
476.
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determine whether a fiduciary duty was owed. 51 The key for the court
was the following language, found in a clause entitled "Standards and
Conflicts":
"'the General Partner ...shall conduct the affairs of the Partnership
in good faith toward the best interest of the Partnership. The General Partner, however, is liable for errors or omissions in performing
its duties with respect to the Partnership only in the case of bad faith,
gross negligence,52or breach of the provisions of this Agreement, but
not otherwise."'
The court noted that the DRULPA allows partners to contractually limit
or eliminate fiduciary duties, 53 that the Delaware Supreme Court had
blessed that part of the DRULPA, 54 and that the court's earlier ruling on
the motion to dismiss had not considered these partnership agreement
provisions because they were not included in the record.5 5 The language
was effective-the court found that the partnership agreement reduced
the general partner's duties "from a fiduciary duty to merely a duty of
granting summary judgment to Kilroy on
good faith," and recommended
56
the claims under § 523(a)(4).
57
Yorkshire, LLC v. TAGT, L.P.

This Fifth Circuit case reviewed a bankruptcy court's order imposing
sanctions on the manager of a Texas limited liability company (and his
attorney) for filing a bankruptcy petition in bad faith and for intentionally
concealing that filing from the LLC members. Yorkshire, LLC was the
sole general partner of TAGT, L.P., the owner of a "custom slaughterhouse" in Houston.5 8 The businesses were owned and operated by the
Luedtke family, which appeared to exercise control over corporate affairs, and Terry Knight, who served as president and manager of Yorkshire, LLC.59 Disagreements arose between Knight and the Luedtke
family over the operation and capitalization of the slaughterhouse,
prompting litigation that precipitated this bankruptcy action. Matters
came to a head when the Luedtkes called for a meeting to be held on
51. Kilroy, 2008 WL 780692, at *6 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d), (f)
(2009)).
52. Id. (quoting Defendant's Exhibit 5, art. 6.05(A)).
53. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d), (f) (2009)).
54. Id. (citing U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. Bell Ati. Mobile Sys., 677 A.2d 497, 501 (Del.

1996)).
55. Id.

56. Id. The magistrate had authority only to recommend, but not to grant, a summary
judgment.
57. 540 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2007)
58. An affiliated business sold livestock to customers, and TAGT slaughtered the livestock according to the customer's specifications. Id. Because TAGT was slaughtering livestock already owned by its customers, it was not subject to the same inspection
requirements and regulations as a slaughterhouse that produced processed meat for sale at,
say, your local grocery or restaurant. Id.
59. Id. The court noted that the record did not clearly identify each party's role within
each entity, but for our purposes (and the court's) Knight was presumed to manage the
entities.
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March 3, 2006, to consider terminating Knight's operational authority in
the Yorkshire entity. Knight asked for, and received, an extension of the
meeting date to March 8, 2006, which the Luedtkes accepted and which
needed to make a bankruptcy filing on behalf of
gave Knight the time he
60
TAGT and Yorkshire.
When the Luedktes learned of the filings, they terminated Knight's authority to act for the entities and intervened in the bankruptcy proceeding. The parties eventually stipulated that the entities were solvent, and
the bankruptcy court dismissed the petition.6 1 The bankruptcy court also
ruled favorably on the Luedtke family's motion for sanctions against
Knight and his attorney for filing the petitions in bad faith, imposing
$50,000 against Knight and $40,000 against his attorney. After a district
action, Knight and his attorney apcourt affirmation of the bankruptcy
62
pealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The most interesting and relevant part of the Fifth Circuit's opinion
concerns whether the court erred in awarding sanctions for the bad faith
filings. The court concluded that it was "well-settled that a federal court,
acting under its inherent authority, may impose sanctions against litigants
or lawyers appearing before the court so long as the court makes a specific finding that they engaged in bad faith conduct. '63 Knight's authority
to file, though disputed, was not the issue. 64 Rather, Knight was liable
because he filed the petition in bad faith, intending to harm the other
members of the LLC. The Fifth Circuit found it especially relevant that
Knight had not argued in his appeal that the bankruptcy filing was in the
65
best interest of the company.
You are-and should be-at your peril if you seek to (ab)use the bankruptcy process as a dispute resolution or pain infliction instrument.
VII.

JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION

66
In re Seneca Investments LLC

This Delaware Chancery Court case reviewed a petition seeking judicial dissolution of Seneca Investments, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company (Seneca). The petition was filed by a "shareholder" 67 who was
the former CEO of Seneca and who argued that Seneca was functioning
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 332. This authority, and sanction, is separate and apart from a "bad faith

filing" action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See generally FED.
R. BANKR. P. 9011.
64. Yorkshire, 540 F.3d at 330 n.2. Indeed, the court noted that Knight had provided
what the court identified as a "corporate certificate" demonstrating his authority, which
the other parties disputed, but "the court did not resolve this dispute." Id. at 330.
65. Id. at 332.
66. 970 A.2d 259 (Del. Ch. 2008).
67. Id. at 261. This was the court's term, not ours, and not one you would expect to be
used to describe an owner of an interest in a limited liability company (at least not by a
court-laypersons do things like that all the time).
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as a passive investment vehicle that had conducted only limited active
business in recent years.6 8 In fact, the petitioner asserted that Seneca,
which held significant assets in cash, stock, and limited partner's interests,
had not undertaken any business since March 2004-that inactivity included failing to hold shareholder or board meetings, to make or dispose
69
of investments, to develop a business plan, and to hire any managers.
Because Seneca's governing documents elected for the company to be
governed as a Delaware corporation, 70 the court said that it was required
to review the judicial dissolution provisions of both the Delaware Limited
Liability Company Act (LLC Act) 71 and the Delaware General Corpora72
tion Law (DGCL).
The judicial dissolution provisions of the LLC Act, section 18-1802,
provide that a court may order dissolution of an LLC "whenever it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the
limited liability company agreement. ' 73 To augment the virtual dearth of
LLC Act case law on the issue, the court looked to decisions under the
dissolution provisions of the Delaware Limited Partnership Act, the closest unincorporated business organization form.7 4 The court found that
previous courts had ordered judicial dissolution when a deadlock prevented a limited partnership from operating, or where it was impossible
for the partnership to fulfill, or continue to fulfill, its purpose. 75 Finding
no evidence of deadlock here, the court looked to Seneca's governing
documents to determine whether it was impossible or impracticable for
Seneca to fulfill its purpose. 76 Seneca's charter stated that "the purpose
of the Company is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the Delaware General Corporation
Law."'77 Consistent with its prior ruling that allowed corporations to exist
solely to hold passive investments under the DGCL,7 8 the Chancery
68. Id. at 260.
69. Id. at 261.
70. Id. We found it curious that the entity would elect to be subject to the LLC Act
for tax purposes, but would then choose to be governed by Delaware corporate law. We
see no express language in the Delaware LLC Act that either sanctions or prohibits that.
71. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2009)).
72. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(3) (2009)).
73. Id. at 262 (citing tit. 6, § 18-802).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 262-63 (citing In re Silver Leaf, LLC, No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641, at
*10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005)). For the Delaware Limited Partnership Act provisions, see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-802 (2005). For more on deadlock, see Silver Leaf, 2005 WL
2045641, at *11, and Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 89 (Del. Ch. 2004). For impossibility of

purpose, see PC Tower Ctr., Inc. v. Tower Ctr. Dev. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, Civ. A. No. 10788,
1989 WL 63901, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1989).
76. Seneca, 970 A.2d at 263. The Chancery Court was following its own lead in partnership cases, where, logically enough, it looked to the purpose clause in partnership
agreements to determine a partnership's purpose. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co. v.
Ameritech Mobile Phone Serv., Civ. A. No. 13389, 1996 WL 506906, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept.
3, 1996); PC Tower Ctr., 1989 WL 63901, at *5.
77. Seneca, 970 A.2d at 263.
78. Id. (citing Giancarlo v. OG Corp, Civ. A. No. 10669, 1989 WL 72022, at *4 (Del.
Ch. June 23, 1989)).
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Court found nothing else in the record to suggest that it was not reasonably practicable for Seneca to carry on that passive business.
The petitioner also argued that Seneca's failure to comply with other
aspects of its operating agreement (e.g., making distributions and providing reports) supported the request for dissolution under the LLC Act.
The court strongly disagreed, noting that a court's role in ordering dissolution under section 18-802 of the LLC Act is limited to the "reasonably
practicable" standard of carrying on business. The court said that, even if
there were violations of the operating agreement, it would not look beyond the purpose clause to determine whether or not the "reasonably
79
practicable" standard had been met.
VIII. PIERCING THE VEIL
80
ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corporation
This case, an adversary proceeding arising from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, concerned a debtor who sued its parent company over an
alleged fraudulent conveyance of stock held by an entity related to the
parent. 81 A full exploration of the facts and issues involved in this case
would require a novel (the case is 153 pages long!); but a more limited
review of some intriguing findings made by the court on reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law justifies a modicum of attention.
Although Delaware courts had not yet recognized the availability of
reverse veil-piercing, the court first noted that it had previously predicted
that Delaware courts would adopt the doctrine if presented with a fact
pattern similar to the one in the case before the court. 82 Next, the court
assumed that the hypothetical Delaware court would use the same equitable considerations to evaluate a reverse veil-piercing claim as it would
in a normal veil-piercing claim.8 3 Under that protocol, a party must
prove that "(1) the parent and subsidiary operated as a single economic
'84
entity, and (2) an overall element of injustice or unfairness is present.
The court then delved at some length into the appropriate evidentiary
standard to apply to a reverse veil-piercing claim, settling on a prepon79. Id. As an absolute, the court's conclusion seems far too strong, even considering
the fact-driven nature of the opinion and the ability of an LLC to function as a passive
investment vehicle (including an LLC masquerading as a corporation). For example, if
someone charged with following the terms of an LLC agreement never did so, could that
not make it impracticable or impossible to carry on the business of the LLC, notwithstanding adherence to a purpose clause? Does one have to separately sue to require compliance
with the agreement? Perhaps so.
80. 396 B.R. 278 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008).
81. Id. at 297-98.
82. Id. at 317. Prescience is a good skill to have!
83. Id. In a "normal" veil-piercing action, a court ignores the separation of an entity
and its owners, allowing a claimant of the entity to satisfy its claims from the assets of the
owner. "Reverse" veil piercing allows a claimant to reach the assets of the company to
satisfy a claim or judgment obtained against an owner. Both claims depend on an alter ego
theory.
84. Id. (citing Foxmeyer Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Foxmeyer Corp.), 290
B.R. 229, 235 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)).
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derance of the evidence standard. 85
A simplistic review of the facts may help an understanding of the other
elements of the case. Plaintiff ASARCO, a Delaware limited liability
company, owned as a significant asset a controlling stock interest in a
corporation. Americas Mining Company (AMC) acquired ASARCO; in
connection with that acquisition, AMC's lender required that the shares
of the ASARCO-controlled corporation be spun off into a new limited
liability company subsidiary of ASARCO (ASARCO Sub), facilitating
the lender's perfection of a security interest in the ownership interests of
ASARCO Sub (instead of in the shares of the corporation itself). 86 Some
time later, AMC-against the advice of its counsel, independent directors, and accountants-caused ASARCO to sell the shares held by
ASARCO Sub to AMC. 87 As directed by AMC, the proceeds of that
conveyance went to select ASARCO creditors; the end result of the
transaction was alleged to be detrimental to other ASARCO creditors. 88
In ASARCO's bankruptcy, Plaintiffs' claims on behalf of ASARCO's
creditors against AMC included that the sale of the shares to AMC (and
the resulting selective payment of the proceeds to creditors preferred by
AMC) was a fraudulent transfer that defrauded ASARCO and its creditors of their rights to share in the fruits of ASARCO's most significant
assets. 89 The fraudulent transfer claim against AMC was based on
AMC's exercise of its "parental" control over ASARCO to force the
preferential sale to AMC of the shares owned by ASARCO Sub. 90 To
succeed on that claim, ASARCO and its creditors first had to demonstrate that they had a claim to ASARCO Sub's interest in the shares; 9 1 to
92
get there, they fashioned this reverse veil-piercing action.
85. Id. at 317-18.
86. Id. at 321-22. The shares carried enhanced voting rights, but were subject to a

shareholders' agreement under which a direct pledge of the shares would trigger conversion to common status, terminating those rights. Id. The lender believed that losing those
voting rights would devalue the shares and, thus, its collateral. Id. Consequently, the
shares were placed into ASARCO Sub and the lender took a security interest in that entity
instead of in the shares directly. Id.

87. Id. at 304-05, 381-82.
88. Id. at 382-83. After the transaction, ASARCO struggled to remain solvent. Con-

tentions were made that the purchase price paid by AMC for the shares was too low,
unfairly benefiting AMC; that argument did not affect the reverse-veil piercing issues.

89. Id. at 315-16.

90. See id. at 378-80. The price charged was alleged to be preferential, but the main
problem was the transfer of control over the proceeds, which enabled AMC to direct the
disposition of those proceeds as it saw fit. And it saw fit to prefer some creditors to others.
91. Id. at 316-17. Otherwise, ASARCO would not have had standing to bring the
claim, as the alleged fraudulent transaction did not involve ASARCO, unless ASARCO
and ASARCO Sub could be deemed to be a common enterprise under alter ego theory.

There was plenty of evidence of this.
92. Id. at 317. The claims would have been meaningless without showing an abuse of
the corporate form, because ASARCO and ASARCO Sub were separate entities. However, if it could be shown that the assets were effectively owned by ASARCO and that

ASARCO Sub's designation as a separate limited liability company should be disregarded,
then ASARCO's creditors could recover from AMC for the stock sale, which should have
benefited ASARCO and all of its creditors, instead of only AMC and a select group of
ASARCO creditors.
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The court first looked to determine whether ASARCO and ASARCO
Sub were operating as a single economic entity, which involves a multifactor test.93 From the facts of the case, the court easily concluded that
ASARCO and ASARCO Sub were operating as a single economic entity-ASARCO Sub had no independent officers or directors and no separate offices or employees, it failed to observe corporate formalities, and
it did not engage in any business activities other than the ownership of
the stock. 94 In addition, the court noted that AMC (and its respective
parent company) treated ASARCO as if it were the owner of the stock,
paid dividends directly to ASARCO, and advanced loans to ASARCO,
using ASARCO Sub as collateral. 95 Further, deposition testimony
showed that, before AMC sold the stock it acquired from ASARCO Sub,
ASARCO Sub did not even have a bank account. 9 6 The court concluded
that, although it was possible that every factor in the single economic
entity test was not met, "the overwhelming weight of the evidence indicates.., that [ASARCO Sub] and ASARCO operated a single economic
unit."97

The court next examined whether the transaction met the second prong
(overall element of injustice or unfairness), emphasizing that this did not
98
Furrequire a finding of fraud, only the lesser injustice or unfairness.
arise
must
or
unfairness
ther, to satisfy the second prong that the fraud
out of the corporate form, "the corporate structure itself must be used to
effect the fraud or injustice." 99 Because almost every breach of contract
or tort involves some manner of injustice, the court stressed that the particular injustice required here must be in the use of the corporateform
before the veil could be pierced.10 0 The court also observed that misuse
of the corporate form in a sophisticated "shell game" to move assets between entities would also satisfy the second prong. 10 1 The court found
that ASARCO Sub was created for a valid purpose (lender requirement),
but that it later was abused to perpetrate a fraudulent transfer of the
shares. 10 2 To support that finding, the court noted that AMC (and its
parent entities) had consistently treated ASARCO as the owner of the
stock held by ASARCO Sub, made loans to ASARCO based on the
93. Id. at 318-19 (citing Alberto v. Diversified Group Inc., 55 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir.
1995) (applying Delaware law)). The factors are: (1) adequate capitalization, (2) solvency,

(3) observation of corporate formalities, (4) whether a dominant shareholder siphoned-off
corporate funds, and (5) whether the corporation, in general, functioned as a facade for a
dominant shareholder. Id. at 319.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 320.
98. Id. (citing Outokumpu Eng'g Enters., Inc. v. Kvaerner, 685 A.2d 724, 729 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1996); Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968)).
99. Id. (citing Outokumpu, 685 A.2d at 729).
100. Id. at 321 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268-270
(D. Del. 1989)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 321-323. At this stage of the opinion, the court assumed arguendo that that
transfer was fraudulent to determine whether the reverse veil-piercing was appropriate.
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stock, and expressly acknowledged ASARCO's ownership of that stock
in press releases and other corporate documents. 10 3 In addition, the
court found that AMC had consistently treated ASARCO and ASARCO
Sub as the same entity until this litigation commenced, at which time an
effort to treat them as separate was made solely to avoid having to pay
the proceeds of the stock sale to certain ASARCO's creditors.10 4 The
court deemed that the second prong had been met, and allowed the re10 5
verse veil-piercing.
IX. BANKRUPTCY
10
In re Shead

6

Partners behaving badly in bankruptcy might be a sub-theme for this
year's Survey. This Southern District of Texas case concerns a partner
who neglected to inform the court that he was in a partnership and that
some of the assets listed in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules were, in
fact, partnership property. 0 7 After his partner intervened in the bankruptcy proceedings, the petitioner admitted to the court that he made the
personal bankruptcy filing to protect partnership property from foreclosure.10 8 The court concluded that the petitioner was using bankruptcy to
"squeeze" his partner out of the partnership. 10 9 Before dismissing the
petition with prejudice, the court noted a few elementary principles of
bankruptcy law pertaining to partnerships that are worth repeating: (a)
partnerships may not file under Chapter 13, and partnership assets may
not be administered under Chapter 13,110 (b) a bankruptcy petition filed
by fewer than all of the general partners must be considered an involuntary case filing even if it is submitted as a voluntary filing,"' and (c)
bankruptcy is not an appropriate forum to resolve disputes over partner12
ship management.'

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
related

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 324.
No. Civ. A. H-08-1386, 2008 WL 1995373 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2008).
Id. at *1. Chapter 13 is available only to an individual with regular, employmentincome.

108. Id.

109. Id. The court also observed, without making a legal finding on the issue, that he
was misusing bankruptcy to avoid fiduciary duties owed to his partner.
110. Id. at *2 (citing Fisk v. Allis Chalmers Credit Corp. (In re Fisk), 36 B.R. 924
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984)); In re Krokos, 12 B.R. 520, 521 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Forestry Prods., Inc. v. Hope, 34 B.R. 753, 754-55 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (discussing legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), which states that Congress intended to exclude
partnerships from Chapter 13)).
111. Shead, 2008 WL 1995373, at *2 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(3)(A), (d); In re Seychelles, 30 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)).
112. Shead, 2008 WL 1995373, at *3.
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In re Rambo Imaging, L.L.P.113

This Western District of Texas bankruptcy case presents two distinct
issues for practitioners: (a) whether one general partner of a partnership
that registers as a limited liability partnership has standing, alone, to file
an involuntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11,114 and (b) whether
a partner may claim to be a limited partner in one court and later claim to
115
be a general partner in another.
On the first issue, the court began by looking at the partnership agreement, and noted that the partnership was organized under the Texas Revised Partnership Act (TRPA) and not the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act (TRLPA), making the partnership a general partner17
ship. 116 The partnership registered as a limited liability partnership;
the partnership agreement did not name the petitioner as the managing
partner, and some acts required the consent of a majority of the partners,
though filing for bankruptcy was not one of them.11 8 Generally,
§ 303(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a single general partner in a
general partnership to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition for the
partnership.1 1 9 The court noted the value of this provision when there is
discord or disagreement between or among general partners-one general partner may want to file when it believes that the partnership or
other partners have committed acts that could result in the filing partner's
having personal liability.1 20 The court believed that that specter of vicarious personal liability for general partners makes it essential that a single
general partner of a multiple-general partner partnership be allowed to
1 21
file bankruptcy to protect his or her own interest.
Although the partnership in question was a general partnership under
the TRPA, the fact that it took the steps to become a registered limited
liability partnership, thus making the general partner a "limited liability
partner, ' 12 2 raised a significant question whether the partner had standing to file an involuntary petition under 303(b)(3). 123 The court found no
113. No. 07-11190-FRM, 2008 WL 2778846 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 15, 2008)).
114. Id. at *1; see also Shead, 2008 WL 1995373. Note the similar issue discussed supra
text accompanying note 112-if this were a "regular" general partnership, such a filing by
one general partner would be a successful involuntary filing.
115. Rambo, 2008 WL 2778846, at *1-5.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id. at *4.This requires a filing with and payment of a fee to the Secretary of State,
and the maintenance of specified insurance coverages. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§§ 152.801 & 153.351 (Vernon Supp. 2008); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08
(Vernon Supp. 2008).
118. Rambo, 2008 WL 2778846, at *3-4.
119. See id. at *5.This is so even for a petition that, on its face, purports to be a voluntary filing. See supra text accompanying note 112.
120. Rambo, 2008 WL 2778846, at *5.
121. See id. It is common for negotiated partnership agreements to prevent any general
partner from making a filing decision, or filing, on its own, which would make any unilateral filing wrongful under the agreement, with the consequences that might flow from that
wrongful action.
122. This was the court's term. Id. at *6-7.
123. Id. at *5-7.
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case
law that had addressed this issue, but did find a treatise that spoke to
it.1 24 The treatise argued that states that grant partners full limited liability protection 125 have given liability protection comparable to that of
shareholders of corporations, and noted that the Bankruptcy Code even
defined "corporation" to include a "partnership association organized
under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible for the
debts for such association. 1 126 The treatise concluded that Congress intended that limited liability partnerships registered in a state that grants
its general partners liability protection similar to that of shareholders of
corporations would be treated as corporations under the Bankruptcy
Code for filing purposes. 127 From that conclusion flowed a position that,
in this standing-to-file context, so-called "limited liability partners"
should not be treated differently from shareholders of a corporation;
thus, the protected general partner would have the same lack of standing
as a shareholder of a corporation, making it ineligible to file an involuntary petition under § 303(b)(3).12 8 The court agreed with the treatise's
argument, noting that the reasoning behind a general partner's need to
file an involuntary petition-protection from potential personal liability-would be absent where the general partnership has registered as a
29
limited liability partnership.'
In addition, the court considered the argument that this same partner
should be estopped from claiming to be a general partner, having argued
in a prior bankruptcy case and in a related state court proceeding that he
was a limited partner. 130 Because the petitioner's status as limited or
general partner was never a material issue in either of those suits, the
court stated that collateralestoppel was not appropriate.13 ' The court did
decide, on its own accord, that petitioner's position on his status as a lim32
ited or general partner changed "as his perceived interest changes,'
which the court found to be a prime case for judicial estoppel. 133 As a
124. Id. at *6.
125. That is, protection in both contract and tort. Originally, the Texas statute did not
protect partners from contract liability. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08
(Vernon Supp. 2008).
126. Rambo, 2008 WL 2778846, at *6 (citing 11 USC § 101(9)(A)(ii) (2006)).
127. Id. at *6-7.
128. Id. (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 303.07[5] (15th ed. rev'd 2008).

129. Id. Not exactly. A partner in a limited liability partnership remains liable for its
own misconduct. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.801 (Vernon Supp. 2008); TEX. REV.

CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08 (Vernon Supp. 2008). But perhaps that plays into the conclusion-the main aim of liability protection in this context is to protect from the vicarious
liability that general partners can have from the actions of other partners in their
partnership.
130. Rambo, 2008 WL 2778846, at *1.
131. Id. at *8. Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of a claim that has already
been finally adjudicated. Id. at *7.
132. Id. at *9.
133. Id. The balancing test of judicial estoppel employed by the Fifth Circuit
determines:
(1) whether the party's later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier
position; (2) whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept
that party's earlier position; (3) whether the party seeking to assert the in-
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result, the court ruled that the petitioner was barred, under the doctrine
of judicial estoppel, from asserting that he was a general partner, even if
it were eventually determined that he, in fact, had standing as a general
partner. 3 4
X.

PURPOSE CLAUSES

35

Bramante v. McClain1

This case involved a plaintiff's attempt to collect on a judgment obtained against one of the defendants, a natural person, McClain; the remaining defendants were limited partnerships and limited liability
companies alleged to be connected with McClain, though the constituent
documents governing a number of those entities did not explicitly include
McClain as an interest holder. 136 The court, curiously, found potential
for liability through a partnership agreement for a group of entities that
pre-dated the existence of the current defendants, but that included McClain as an interest holder. 37 The court focused its attention on the purpose clause of this prior partnership-the partnership was created for the
purpose of "devising, creating, designing, pursuing, formulating, enacting
and engaging in all companies, corporations, partnerships, or legal entities which are or have been or will be used by [a number of parties, including McClain] for the purpose of creating any income or tangible item
recognized as having value. 1 38 Even though McClain did not, on paper,
have an ownership interest in some of the defendants in the case, the
broad purpose clause, combined with some limited capitalization evi139
dence, was enough for the court to deny summary judgment.
The court's use of the purpose clause to potentially stretch liability to
an apparently unrelated entity is alarming. The lesson for practitioners is
to avoid drafting a purpose clause that is overly broad in scope ("or will
be"; "any income") and, perhaps, unintentionally party specific ("legal
entities which are or have been or will be used by [McClain]"). Given
that this was a summary judgment opinion, and that many factors went
into the totality-of-circumstances decision, we do not want to overstate
consistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.
Id. at *8 (citing In re ARK-LA-TEX Timber Co., Inc. 482 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).
134. Id. at *9.Here, the court appeared to be hedging its bet against an overturn of its
standing ruling. Id. In any event, talking out of both sides of your mouth, as the petitioner
did, to serve your own purposes can come back to haunt.
135. Civ. A. No. SA-06-CA-0010OG (NN), 2007 WL 4555943 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
2007).
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). The defendant's claim that that partnership was no
longer in existence was rejected by the court in the face of a still extant term and the
absence of evidence of the partnership's being wound down.
139. Id. at *5-6. Effectively, the court said that it saw enough intent and connection to
put those defendants to proving that they were not, in fact, connected to McClain and that
he had no interest in them that should be available to his judgment creditor.
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the significance of the opinion. Nevertheless, practitioners should be
mindful of their purpose clauses.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The cases in this year's Survey continue to fine-tune the law of partnerships and other unincorporated business organizations. The increase in
volume of cases involving limited liability companies is not surprising,
given their increasing popularity (especially in Texas with the leveling of
the franchise tax playing field). If there are common themes from this
year's cases they might broadly be lumped as: (i) careless drafting and
poor execution of litigation procedure can produce unexpected results
and (ii) misuse of the court system to resolve personal disputes will not be
sanctioned.

1364

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

